A group of eminent academics, led by Paul Boghossian and Kwame Anthony Appiah, recently issued a Report on the State of Scholarship in the Humanities and the Humanistic Social Sciences. They did not like what they found. The authors are highly disturbed by politicization of scholarship, which, they find, often reaches the point of denying that there is any value in seeking the truth:
For example, in a 2021 presidential address to the American Anthropological Association, UCLA anthropology professor Akhil Gupta declared that “anthropology is an outlier among the social sciences ... because its political project is to challenge the culturally dominant commonsense of capitalist consumerism”.
In a reply published in American Anthropologist, University of Colorado Boulder population geneticist Fernando Villanea emphasised the point that “the value of anthropology is not the pursuit of truth, because all truth is subjective,” but rather to “serve the interests” of people who have been harmed by anthropologists in the past. Two years later, in the same journal, José Santos argued that “all ethnographies”—the stock in trade of cultural anthropology—have as their goal “not voyeurism but advocacy”; as if the goal of describing the social world and making sense of it was not only not on the menu, but that it was to be disparaged as a kind of perversion. Taken literally, such remarks call, not for scholarship in the service of a social goal, but for a rejection of the core idea that scholarship aims at understanding.
If anything this careful critique understakes what has happened in anthropology and sociology, where the very notion of truth has been completely discarded in favor of advocacy. There are many spaces – journals, conferences, private conversations – where “seeking the truth” is mentioned only as a concept held up to mockery, and questioning the assumption that scholarship exists to serve the marginalized draws either laughter or furor.
The authors have a different ideal in mind:
Part of the raison d’ĂȘtre of a university is that it should engage in disinterested inquiry — inquiry aimed at knowledge and understanding, both for their own sake and for the sake of further goods that require genuine knowledge and understanding, rather than ideologically informed opinion, for their promotion. This, at least in part, is what universities are for. Indeed, it might well be thought that one of the greatest contributions a university can make to society is to provide a model of what disinterested inquiry can be and how it might thereby be of value. If the pursuit of disinterested inquiry is compromised, it strikes at the very foundation on which a university should be based, just as the corrupt administration of justice strikes at the foundation upon which a system of justice should be based.
I agree.
Shorter, less bureaucratic version of the argument in Quillette.
























.jpg)

.jpg)

















.jpg)








