JSTOR daily called my attention to a fascinating article on the teaching of history in Russian schools. It begins like this:
In May 2016, a few hundred teachers and education officials took part in a conference hosted by the Moscow regional parliament. The theme was ‘history teaching as a national security issue’, and the conference was part of a larger cycle of events devoted to the patriotic education of the young — how to make people love and be proud of their country and its history. The main speaker, a professor of history at one of Moscow’s universities, painted a picture of Russia as being the target of a US-directed information war with the ultimate aim of breaking up and destroying the Russian Federation. His core message was that the current official Russian ban on state ideology makes it impossible to use history as a defensive weapon in this information war. Not being able to defend Russian historical science against the enemy onslaught would lead to the disintegration of historical consciousness and, ultimately, ‘the death of Russia’.Here's another good bit:
A 2015 paper published by a Kremlin-affiliated think tank warned that “if the current state of history teaching in schools continues, Russia will run the risk, in the next 10–15 years, of losing her sovereignty and being split up into several dozens or hundreds of territories that will inevitably fight each other.”Russia is a multi-ethnic state; or, if you prefer, an empire. Ethnic Russians are a clear majority, making up around 72% of the total. But there are plenty of areas where some other group outnumbers them, e.g. Chechnya and parts of central Asia. Russian nationalists therefore focus a lot of attention on convincing all those minorty groups that they are really Russians. There is nothing particularly unique about this; many modern nations have regions or ethnic groups not sure they belong in the larger state.
To get back to education, the strategy Russian education authorities have hit on to encourage Russian nationalism is to emphasize World War II:
The history on which the government focuses its energy is almost exclusively military, with a very heavy emphasis on the “Great Patriotic War”—not precisely what we would call World War II, but, specifically, the 1941–1945 fight between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Putin has argued that the war is a topic that unites Russians across ideological, and generational lines. . . .
Starting with President Boris Yeltsin in the late 1990s, and intensifying with his successor, Vladimir Putin, the nation’s leaders attempted to reclaim “the Russian idea” with manifestations including Victory Day military parades and the revival of Soviet-era “patriotic education.” Other methods for spreading the orthodox view of history include military-style youth organizations and government-approved talk shows, cartoons, and documentaries. Meanwhile, a 2014 law made it a crime to spread historical narratives deemed contrary to patriotic values.Which I find fascinating in an academic sort of way.
What makes this urgently relevant is how it relates to the Putin regime's desperate determination to subdue Ukraine. Yes, Putin is a grasping, greedy thug. But I think he seriously believes in Russia as a multi-ethnic but powerfully united state. He believes that Chechens and Buryats are just special kinds of Russians who should love Russia as much as ethnic Russians do, and he believes that this is vital to Russia remaining a great and powerful state.
He believes the same about Ukraine. To him, Ukrainian nationalism is a mistake, just like Chechen or Buryat nationalism would be.
So to Putin, subduing Ukraine is not an external war; it is about the unity and power of Russia.
4 comments:
Yes, Putin is a grasping, greedy thug. But I think he seriously believes in Russia as a multi-ethnic but powerfully united state. He believes that Chechens and Buryats are just special kinds of Russians who should love Russia as much as ethnic Russians do, and he believes that this is vital to Russia remaining a great and powerful state.
No, you are completely off your rocker here. You don't repeatedly commit genocides over the centuries against people you view as a "special kind" of your own people.
Putin doesn't think they're "special kinds of Russians". He thinks they're "subhuman vermin". As do the vast majority of Russians.
They just all understand that there are some things it is better to speak about in "politically correct" terms. They do not see these minorities as "Russians", but as "subjects of Russia", who should meekly submit to their betters, for their own good.
You may as well argue that Andrew Jackson saw slaves as "a special kind of American", rather than as chattel to be exploited.
Reading this puts me in mind of my increasing conviction that there are no good, lasting solutions to the problems humans experience in living together. It is bad when an "empire," such as contemporary Russia, makes it policy to indoctrinate citizens in a belligerently patriotic myth of their own history, preach truculent resentment of foreigners, teach fantasies of violent vengeance for perceived slights and reacquisition of lost provinces (or grandiose fantasies of gaining new ones), quash internal ethnic difference, and enforce ethnic homogeneity--whether or not, as will admittedly often be the case, they continue to regard their ethnic minorities as inferior citizens, draft them as cannon fodder in preference to other groups, etc. But the breakup of such an empire into ethnically-identified ministates isn't better. Such states, as history has well demonstrated, tend to enforce very similar policies in their own restricted spheres. And we've seen that, where a decadent, cosmopolitan, mild-mannered, consumerist liberalism (of the sort I personally love) takes hold, where the history taught is critical and ironic, many people feel their lives have lost meaning, and long for some more incandescent, belligerent group identity that makes them feel they have a cause.
I'm reminded of Scott Siskind's online novel Unsong, which, I'm told, suggests the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be ended if an ASI were to create two virtual worlds, one for Israelis in which Palestinians don't exist, and one for Palestinians in which Israelis don't exist.
So to Putin, subduing Ukraine is not an external war; it is about the unity and power of Russia.
Or put another way, to Putin, international law and the sovereignty of other countries don't exist.
Not to defend Russia, but in Russian there is Ruskie "ethnic Russian" and Rossiyanin "Russian" and both that words are translated as Russian in English (and Polish) - szopen.
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