Thursday, May 2, 2024

Doing Honor to African History

These days most American and European historians of Africa want to do honor to Africans. But they take very different approaches to doing this.

One school hopes to lift up Africans by blaming all their problems on outsiders. If Africans participated in the slave trade, that must have been because outsiders somehow forced them to. If their politics were a mess, that is because Europeans (or, earlier, Arabs) ruined them. For example, one theory holds that Europeans got Africans to sell so many of their people abroad by creating an arms race that forced all African leaders to spend heavily for imported weapons.

John Thornton thinks that such theories are first, wrong, and second, make Africans out to be much weaker and stupider than they really were. In Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (1992) he set out to show that Africans were not overmastered by Europeans in that period, but chose to do what they did for their own reasons. He is, in one way of putting this, restoring agency to Africans in the slave trade era.

Thornton points out that when Europeans tried to conquer pieces of mainland Africa in this period they almost always failed. European ships and canons allowed them to seize offshore islands but taking even coastal islands was beyond their capability. The one exception was the Portugese seizure of part of Angola, and that only happened because they intervened in an African civil war, helped one side win, and got a substantial territory as their reward. Their attempts to extend that territory in the 1600s were defeated.

Thornton notes that in the period he covers European manufacturing was not much more advanced than it was in Africa. Europe's most valuable exports in that period were cloth, metal goods, and horses. Horses, of course, were hardly any kind of European innovation; they just happen to breed more readily in cooler places. European cloth was valued in Africa, not because it was better, but because it was different, and the African elite liked to have new and different ways to show off their status. The Portuguese also made money by carrying African cloth from one region to another, and to Brazil, so they certainly saw African textiles as something worth dealing in. And, says Thornton, European exports never amounted to more than 5% of the African market, even in coastal kingdoms. 

As for metal, African smiths could make crucible steel, so they could equal the finest European products; not until after 1750 or so did European metallurgy acquire any real technical advantage over the rest of the world. Africa did have something of a metal shortage, because they were short of charcoal for smelting, but even so European imports did not control a large share of the market until the 1800s. 

Nor did the traditional, trans-Saharan trade routes ever die out. For horses in particular the cross-Sahara route remained viable, and Thornton says some African merchants positioned themselves to be able to draw on whichever source had more and better product that year. African merchants, both native and creole, were big operators who could deal on equal terms with European traders.

One major advantage the Europeans did have was in certain weapons, notably canons and armor. But the pope forbade selling weapons to Africans, and the European powers do seem to have been reluctant to sell advanced weapons for the first few centuries. Even when they began to acquire muskets in the 1600s, African armies did not make much use of them; our accounts of African battles in this period show the use of a few canons for attacking forts, but otherwise a lot of spears and swords. (Even so, they regularly defeated European forces, for example by swarming ships with bowmen in canoes.) So, says Thornton, there was no sense in which Africans were forced to trade with Europeans.

Unfortunately Thornton's book ended just when the worst period of the slave trade was getting going, so I don't know what he has to say about the 1680 to 1750 period. But it certainly remained true that African kingdoms and African merchants were independent operators who made their own decisions and defied Europeans who tried to boss them around.

My favorite part of this book was the short chapter on Christianity in pagan Africa. Thornton says that Africans and Europeans Christians easily understood each other's religious ideas, because they were similar: both posited a spiritual world to which certain people had access, and from which revelations might come. The biggest problem many Africans had with Christianity was that its key revelations took place too long ago and far away; they wanted messages closer to themselves in space and time. Thornton says Africans were more impressed by immediate signs. For example, the Jesuits drew large audiences when they used Christian divination to decide which saints to dedicate their new churches to. In the period Thornton covers many Africans "converted to Christianity" to the extent that they attended Christian services and consulted priests for magical aid, but without giving up other sources of spiritual assistance.

Thornton's book is also eye-opening on the vast scale of the documents available for the study of African history in this period. Most of them were written by Europeans, but they were written by a wide variety of men working from a dozen nations, giving us a rich potraryal of these lands at least as they related to trade and coastal governance. The number of African polities Thornton was able to map and describe frankly astonished me. The African trade was highly politicized and always required managing local governments and local power brokers, so European traders made very careful notes on who those people were and how best to deal with them.

African history is intimidating because the space is so huge, the number of independent states so great (hundreds), the vocabulary so strange and varied, the sources scattered across two continents in dozens of languages. Most of us also lack the basic framework for understanding that we acquired in school about the European past. Getting entrance to this mysterious kingdom of the past is not easy, but after a dozen books I feel like I am at least starting to idle around the threshold.

2 comments:

  1. 1/2

    Thornton points out that when Europeans tried to conquer pieces of mainland Africa in this period they almost always failed. European ships and canons allowed them to seize offshore islands but taking even coastal islands was beyond their capability. The one exception was the Portuguese seizure of part of Angola, and that only happened because they intervened in an African civil war, helped one side win, and got a substantial territory as their reward. Their attempts to extend that territory in the 1600s were defeated.

    Such failures were largely logistical and environmental in nature, not the result of African armed resistance. You can only fit a few hundred men onto a sailing ship - and if such a ship is to go on and sail anywhere else, it can only spare a portion of that to remain behind on shore. There's only so much land you can effectively control with such small numbers. There were also only so many men willing to stay behind, possibly permanently, in a hostile foreign land.

    The entire western coast of Africa ranges from blasted rocky desert, to savanna, to tropical jungle, back to savanna, back to desert. There are absolutely no temperate zones until you get to the interior of Angola, or reach South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. Even the Spanish and the Portuguese were not used to such climates - Iberia can get a bit warm and dry, but it still doesn't compare to the deserts of the western African coast; and no one in Europe was primed for jungles.

    Almost all of Africa falls within the so-called "Malaria Belt" as well. Only the extreme North and the extreme South do not have to contend with rampant, endemic malaria - a disease to which the arriving Europeans had no defenses. At the same time, unlike in the Americas, the locals were not susceptible to the European diseases like measles, smallpox, typhus, etc, as they'd long been exposed and had developed their own immunities.

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  2. 2/2

    So let's stack up the disadvantages. Europeans couldn't bring in enough people to control much land. Even if they could have, they didn't know the land very well, and faced violent resistance from locals who knew it VERY well. Even if they learned the terrain well enough to operate in it effectively, they still couldn't overcome the debilitating effects of extreme heat, disease, etc.

    Even if they built up resistances to heat and disease over enough time, they still couldn't source food very well - European crops were unsuited to any of the terrain types; local crops were foreign to them and even if they wanted to eat them, they didn't know how to grow them; and local wildlife was similarly unfamiliar, and thus hard to effectively hunt or husband. The one area of food rearing where Europeans found success was in "seeding" islands with European livestock like pigs, providing a familiar food source that could be left untended when the ships left and then "harvested" when they returned. But this proved devastating to the local environments over time, and was not sustainable.

    Africa's tropical woods have many uses, but they are ill suited to ship construction or repair. Africa's fiber crops likewise have many uses, but are ill suited to making ropes and sails. Even if they weren't, European traders were unfamiliar with how to work with such plants and render them into useful resources.

    As you already noted, Africa doesn't have much coal - so quality metal would have to be sourced from Europe. Similarly, African has virtually no saltpetre - there are some small desposits in the Maghreb, a deposit in Angola, and another deposit under the Red Sea. The ones that aren't literally underwater are difficult to access even in the present day, and would have been both almost entirely unknown and virtually unreachable in pre-modern times. Without saltpetre, you don't have gunpowder with which to fire your guns, and so you are once again dependent on sourcing from Europe.

    In effect, it was almost literally impossible for Europeans to achieve anything beyond setting up small, coastal outposts. There was no real way for them to thrive in the region until modern advances like quinine, chemical fertilizers, railroads, and steamships made basic survival and logistical problems much easier to overcome. Which is why the Scramble for Africa only happened in the late 1800s, going from only 10% of the continent being under European control at the time of the American Civil war, to about 90% being controlled at the outbreak of World War I.

    The exceptions, of course, are fairly obvious. South Africa, with a temperate climate, a small native population, and an abundance of minerals, was extensively colonized in fairly short order after being reached by Europeans. Madagascar was similarly a less hostile place to inhabit, and was similarly far more colonized than anything on the western coast. Angola, as you noted, saw a formal land grant as part of a bargain - the Portuguese never could have taken that much land by force, and they struggled to effectively rule over what they had anyway.

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